Attackers impersonating IT support used Microsoft Teams and user-approved remote sessions to reach corporate identity systems, Microsoft Threat Intelligence says. In two investigated intrusions, certificate-service weaknesses then opened paths to privileged accounts, showing why a password reset alone may not close the door.
Watch Desk analysis
What happened
Microsoft describes a shared starting point: attackers posed as help-desk staff in Teams messages or calls, persuaded users to grant remote access, and used the sessions to stage files and run portable software. They then discovered Active Directory Certificate Services, which can issue certificates used to authenticate as users or devices.
The intrusions split at that point. In one, attackers abused an improperly configured certificate template, known as ESC1, to request certificates for privileged accounts. In the other, they relayed a domain controller’s authentication to a certificate enrolment service, a technique called ESC8, and used the resulting certificate for Kerberos access.
Why it matters
A certificate can provide a lasting route into an organisation even after the original workstation is reimaged or a password is changed. Microsoft says defenders should investigate issued certificates and Kerberos activity as well as the initial device and account. In one case, an identity excluded from automated containment remained available to the attackers; in the other, customer-led isolation of the associated workstation was followed by no further observed progression.
The report is a reminder that a familiar support tool can become the first step in a much larger compromise when someone is persuaded to hand over control. The danger is not a Teams vulnerability, Microsoft says, but social engineering combined with insecure certificate-service settings.
Our read
The useful lesson is to treat an unexpected remote-support request as an identity-security incident, not merely a suspicious call. Organisations should review certificate templates and enrolment endpoints, check whether every relevant identity can be contained, and correlate certificate requests with the account, device and subsequent Kerberos activity. Portable software in a newly created user folder is not proof of an attack, but after an unsolicited support session it deserves a closer look.
What to watch
- Whether organisations audit certificate templates for overly broad enrolment rights and requester-supplied identity information.
- Whether certificate-enrolment records, source devices and Kerberos activity are checked together after a suspected compromise.
- Whether automated containment covers every privileged identity, without exclusions that leave an attacker a usable route.
Discussion spark: When a user approves a remote-support session, should organisations treat that as a trigger for identity-wide checks, or is that too disruptive for ordinary support work?
Sources and evidence
- From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths – Microsoft (30 October 2026, 16:11 UTC)
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