An essay in the New York Review of Books argues that the pursuit of permanent US dominance in AI could make cooperation with China less likely and intensify the race it is meant to win. Its central challenge to “AI primacy” is that a lead may bring real advantages without delivering the permanent, controllable supremacy its advocates imagine.
Watch Desk analysis
What happened
The essay, by Julian Gewirtz, examines competing views among US technology leaders and officials about AI and China. Anthropic chief executive Dario Amodei has argued that US AI superiority could help democracies secure a lasting advantage; Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang, by contrast, has said he does not think it matters whether the US or China wins the AI race. The essay also points to warnings from other technology figures that seeking a strategic monopoly could provoke escalation or conflict.
Gewirtz argues that the leap from building more capable AI to achieving lasting geopolitical dominance is far from assured. He raises questions about technological diffusion, espionage, independent discoveries and whether an advantage held by US companies would reliably become power controlled by the US government. The essay also cites a survey from early September in which 69% of respondents supported strong AI rules even if they slowed US development, while 14% favoured holding back major regulation to help US companies stay ahead of China.
Why it matters
The argument is not that US and Chinese AI development are interchangeable, or that strategic competition can simply be wished away. It is that treating permanent supremacy as the prize could make restraint look like surrender to both sides, even when the risks of a faster race are the reason for seeking cooperation.
That is a consequential distinction for debates over AI safeguards and international diplomacy. A country can want a technological lead without assuming that an enduring monopoly is achievable, or that the attempt to secure one will make the world safer. Gewirtz’s essay supplies an argument, not proof that either country will respond in one particular way.
Our read
The strongest question here is not who wins the AI race, but what “winning” is supposed to mean. A lead in research or infrastructure is not automatically lasting state power, and a promise of eventual dominance is a poor substitute for explaining how the risks are meant to be managed. The essay is worth reading as a challenge to the assumption that accelerating now will make restraint easier later. That assumption has rather a lot riding on it.
What to watch
- Whether US and Chinese officials turn their stated interest in AI communication into substantive discussions about risks and safeguards.
- How policymakers balance export controls and strategic competition with domestic rules for AI development.
- Whether future surveys show public support for safety rules holding as AI competition intensifies.
Discussion spark: Can the US pursue a meaningful AI lead without making permanent dominance the goal, or would any attempt at restraint simply hand an advantage to China?
Sources and evidence
- Source update (13 October 2026, 12:00 UTC)
- Qnity Bets On Local Production To Win More AI Chip Business From Nvidia, TSMC – CEO Touts ‘Local-For-Local’ Strategy – TradingView (13 October 2026, 12:00 UTC)
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